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Abstract. A recent theoretical literature highlighted the potential dangers of 
further increasing information disclosure by central banks. This paper gives a 
continuous empirical investigation of the existence of an optimal degree of 
transparency in the lines of van der Cruijsen et al. [35]. We test a quadratic 
relationship between central bank transparency and the inflation persistence by 
introducing some technical and economic modifications. Particularly, we used 
three new measures of transparency. An appropriate U shape test that was made 
through a Stata routine, recently developed by Lind and Mehlum [25], indicates 
a robust optimal intermediate degree of transparency, but its level is not. These 
results were obtained using a panel of 11 OECD central banks under the period 
1999-2009. The estimations were run using a bias corrected LSDVC, a newly 
recent technique developed by Bruno [5] for short dynamic panels with fixed 
effects, extended to accommodate unbalanced data.  
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Whether central banks shall increase their information disclosure any 
further is an issue that has important implications for both theoretical 
and empirical literature on central bank transparency. Having been 
characterized by secrecy for a long time ago, central banks seem to 
bring considerable efforts in enhancing their transparency practices. 
The importance lies in influencing the management of expectations, 
which is a key element of monetary policy decision-making. 
Central bank transparency seems to be the norm, but how exactly 
that transparency should go? In fact, central banks face a potential 
conflict; a maximum of transparency needs not to be optimal for the 
efficiency of monetary policy. Accordingly, a conflict may occur when 
giving more information but with less clarity and common 
understanding among market participants as there are limits on how 
much information can be digested (Kahneman, [23]). Too much 
information may crowd out the formation of private beliefs which are 
crucial sources of information for a central bank, and thus for the 
effectiveness of the monetary policy decision-making.  
Not everyone agrees that maximum transparency is optimal. 
Looking for example, at inflation targeting countries in Europe: The 
Norges bank (Norway) and the Sveriges bank (Sweden) have in recent 
years begun publishing their projections of the policy rate
2. This issue 
has fed the debate regarding the possible harmful effects of such 
excessive transparency, especially with central banks that have an 
already high score of transparency. Andersson and Hoffman [1] argue 
that announcing the future interest rate path tracks may neither improve 
the predictability of monetary policy nor does anchor long term 
inflation expectations. Theoretically, there are two arguments that 
favour limiting transparency: uncertainty and confusion/information 
overload. In fact, by revealing too much information, agents focus on 
the complexity of the design of monetary policy and the uncertainty 
surrounding the forecasts. Moreover, the assumption that economic 
                                                 
2 “A reason for doing this is to increase leverage over the longer term interest rates in 
the economy and hence be better in steering the important variables of the economy. 
As Norges Bank and Riksbank are inflation forecasting central banks, the publication 
of an endogenous interest rate forecast is important information to the private agents 




agents are able to absorb and attach a weight to all information 
provided by the central bank is probably high. This can lead to 
deterioration in the quality of inflation expectations (van der Cruijsen et 
al., [35]). The question of further information disclosure is especially 
appealing for central banks with high degree of credibility like OECD 
countries. 
This paper extends the analysis of van der Cruijsen et al. [35] in 
number of ways;  
First by making technical changes: 
1.  Introducing fixed effects
3 to the panel model  
2.  Using another set of control variables different from that used in van 
der Cruijsen et al. [35]. 
3. Changing the frequency of data, so we worked on an annual basis 
while the above authors used quarterly data
4.  
Second, our economic contribution consists of checking the presence of 
an optimal intermediate transparency degree by trying three other 
measures of transparency: 
4. We take the index of Minegishi and Cournède [27] as transparency’s 
parameterization in our framework. The rationale behind the use of 
such index is its high correlation with the one updated by Dincer and 
Eichengreen [12], that is the index used in the empirical analysis of 
van der Cruisjen et al. [35]. To the best of our knowledge, we are the 
first to exploit such indicator to prove the existence of an optimal 
transparency degree. 
5. A comparative result is made available by using the updated index of 
transparency by Siklos [31]. 
6. Due to multidimensional character of transparency concept, the 
hypothesis that the sub-indexes composing the overall index are 
correlated is very probable. In such case, a Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) would be suitable to construct a new transparency 
index. 
 
                                                 
3 A Fisher test was conducted prior to estimation in order to check the presence of individual 
effects. 




Third, we argue that the usual test of non-linear relationship is flawed
5, 
and derive the appropriate test for a U-shaped relationship by using a 
Stata routine recently developed by Lind and Mehlum [25]. 
 The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides an 
overview of literature that favours limiting transparency. Section 3 
presents the methodology, explains the new indicator of transparency 
used, and describes how well this indicator is related to inflation 
persistence, thereby providing new insights with respect to the 
robustness of previous research. Section 4 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2 Literature review and further arguments in favor of limiting 
transparency 
 
A number of empirical and theoretical studies claim central bank 
transparency to have favourable effect on the economy (Dincer and 
Eichengreen  [12], Minegishi and Cournède [27], Middeldorp [26], 
Trabelsi and Ayadi [34]). Some other papers, however, come to a 
different conclusion and find that either higher transparency is 
unfavourable or that it has an ambiguous effect at mitigating the 
uncertainty. In the literature related to the optimal degree of 
transparency, we find that transparency has not the same benefits or 
costs following the same theoretical framework. Indeed, the economy 
specification and the model assumptions can affect the optimal degree 
of transparency. This explains why theoretical conclusions may seem, 
at first glance, not robust. 
However, even if we restrict the study of transparency by 
focusing on a specific well-defined model, the optimal degree of 
transparency can be different depending on the size of the information 
upon which the asymmetry information is based. This observation 
coincides with the words of Hahn [21]: "One reason for the 
controversial debate about transparency, despite the seemingly wide-
spread consensus that transparency is desirable, is that people have 
different views as to what transparency of monetary policy is." 
                                                 




In practice, while the benefits associated with certain aspects of 
the information seem indisputable (for example, the publication of a 
numerical inflation target, the immediate announcement of the decision 
of the monetary policy ...), conclusions with regard to other dimensions 
of transparency are not always unanimous. The controversy between 
Buiter [4] and Issing [22] about the publication of minutes and voting 
records is an example of the lack of consensus on transparency with 
respect to certain types of information.
Geraats [19] gives an excellent overview of the pros and cons of 
transparency with several examples of welfare reducing information in 
a Barro-Gordon framework. By limiting transparency, Cukierman [8] 
argues that the expected welfare is improved. Faust and Svensson [15] 
show that complete transparency lead to inflationary bias. Van der 
Cruisjen et al. [35] concluded that there might be a limit to the benefit 
of transparency and that an intermediate degree of transparency might 
be desirable. Theoretical idea is that agents may become confused by 
information they receive that is in excess of the optimal level of 
transparency. 
Such idea is consistent with the seminal paper of Morris and Shin 
[28] based on coordination games. According to theses authors, 
transparency could be costly if private sector agents put too much 
weight on the central bank’s public signal because they are attempting 
to second-guess each other and the public signal acts as a focal point 
for higher order beliefs. Svensson [33] raises doubts over whether the 
parameter range necessary to deliver costly transparency in Morris and 
Shin’s model is likely to hold in reality
6. Demertzis and Hoeberichts 
[10] established a reasonable parameter range for which more 
transparency is not always desirable when it is costly for the private 
sector to process information. More public information reduces the 
incentives for the private sector to gather their own private information. 
Recently, Bayeriswyl [2] thinks that accounting for information 
endogeneity highlights the detrimental effects of central bank 
transparency. Hence, endogenous information entails a further 
argument in favour of limiting transparency.  
                                                 
6 Morris, Shin, and Tong [29] provide some counter-arguments. They argue that if public signal 





3 Econometric modeling 
This section describes transparency data along with the other control 
variables used in the empirical analysis, and explains the econometric 
methodology employed before discussing the results. 
3.1  Model description and preliminary analysis 
3.1.1. Data
New measure of inflation persistence and its link to the quality of 
inflation forecasts 
Since it is difficult to measure the quality of inflation forecasts, we 
follow van der cruijsen et al. [35] and take the degree of backward 
lookingness as a proxy. The lower the quality of inflation forecasts is, 
the larger the degree to which inflation will be set in a backward 
looking manner. It turns that inflation will be more persistent. Let us 
illustrate this by using a simple hybrid New Keynesian Philippe Curve 
(NKPC): 
                                      t t b t t f t kx E      1 1                                           (1) 
Where  it  is the inflation rate and  t x is the output gap. In the limiting 
case of 0  b  , the equation become the pure forward looking NKPC 
and there’s no endogenous inflation persistence. When 0  b  , we get 
NKPC with endogenous inflation persistence, the higher  b  is, the 
higher endogenous inflation persistence will be. 
Now, we need a measure for inflation persistence. There’s little 
agreement in the extant literature on how best to measure inflation 
persistence or persistence in general. Fuhrer [18] enumerated a battery 
of measures that attempt to capture the persistence in inflation: 
 Conventional unit root tests; 
 The autocorrelation function of the inflation series  




 The dominant root of the univariate autoregressive inflation 
process
7; 
 The sum of the autoregressive coefficients for inflation; 
 Unobserved components decompositions of inflation that 
estimate the relative contributions of “permanent” and 
“transitory” components of inflation (for example, the IMA(1,1) 
and related models proposed by Stock and Watson [32]). 
 
The most employed measures are the second, the third and the fifth 
ones. This is because the autocorrelation function summarizes much of 
the information in time series; it may be then the best overall measure 
of persistence. In what follows, we will show that the measure 
suggested by van der Cruijsen et al. [35]) is even better (The one given 
in expression (3)).  
Variable of interest: Transparency score 
According to Geraats ([Error! Reference source not found.], p. 8), 
“One of the biggest impediments to transparency research has been the 
dearth of data. It is not surprising since it is challenging to measure to 
what extent the private sector has the same information as the 
monetary policy makers.” There were two approaches to measuring 
transparency. The first one focuses on financial market reactions to 
monetary policy decisions and communications (See for instance, 
Blinder [3], Ehrmann and Fratzcher [13]….). The second one, which 
interests us, focuses on the availability of information that is pertinent 
to the policy maker: e.g. the survey conducted by Fry et al. [17] for 94 
central banks in 1998. Transparency is a qualitative concept for which 
few measures exist. Generally, we evaluate it punctually or for a 
restricted number of central banks, based on three criteria: the rapidity 
by which the central bank explains its decisions of monetary policy, the 
frequency of prospective analysis and the periodicity of bulletin and 
speeches published. Eijffinger and Geraats [14] have constructed 
complete indexes that distinguish five aspects of transparency as 
designed in the typology of Geraats [19]. Dincer and Eichengreen [12] 
                                                 
7 As claimed by van der cruisjen et al. “Critique on the largest autoregressive root is the fact 





have expanded theses indexes by exploiting annual data on 100 central 
banks under the period 1998-2006. 
In fact, the first indirect attempt to test the existence of an 
intermediate degree of transparency was brought by Dincer and 
Eichengreen  [12]
8 themselves. However, they used a classical 
definition of the inflation persistence that is the coefficient resulting 
from the regression of inflation on its first-lagged value. The 
estimations’ results fail, however, to detect any significant impact of 
transparency in its quadratic form.  
Based on central banks’ information set, Minegishi and Cournède 
[27]have constructed the transparency index for 11 OECD central 
banks over the period 1999-2009. Table A.2 and Table A.3 show some 
descriptive statistics of that index as well as the correlation with the 
score of Siklos [31]. It follows that the correlation is quite high between 
both indicators (0.73) although there are some notable differences such 
as the ranking of central banks, the methodology of calculating both 
indexes, for example the index of Siklos which is based initially on 
Eijffinger and Geraats [14], contains 15 sub-index related to five 
aspects of transparency (political, economic, procedural, policy and 
operational) and the procedure is simply to sum up theses sub-indexes. 
Minegishi and Cournède [27] aggregated the scores relative to four 
aspects of transparency (policy objective, policy decision, economic 
analysis and decision-making process) using equal weights within each 
category. The overall measure includes 22 sub-indexes (See Appendix 
B for details). The index has significantly increased by 30.4% from 
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Fig. 1. Evolution of central bank transparency in OECD countries based on Minegishi and 
Cournède data. The cells coloured in green are the transparency index in 1999 and the pink 




  Output gap as a % of GDP: the difference between actual GDP and 
potential GDP, it is considered as the main indicator of inflationary 
pressures. 
  Exports as % of GDP: it is used as a competition indicator. When 
competition is fierce, inflation persistence will be lower 
  Inflation targeting: the conduct of better monetary policy explains 
low inflation. To prevent central bank transparency from grasping up 
an overall better conduct on monetary policy, we correct this for the 
fact that some countries are inflation targeters. 
  Governance factors: the rule of Law measures the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rule of society, and in 
particular, the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the 












3.1.2. Model’s specification 
 
In a panel context, for a given group of regressors, the estimated 
econometric model consists of the following equation: 
     it
Q
p
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1 4 1 3 1 2 1         (2) 
Where  it  is the inflation rate, expressed as the percentage 
increase of Consumer Price Index (CPI),  it X is the set of control 
variables that affect the inflation rate,  it T is the transparency score and 
it Y is the set of variables that determines the inflation persistence. 
Van der Cruijsen et al. [35] propose an original definition of inflation 
persistence (P), which is according to equation (2): 
                                      

    
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                               (3)  
Where the coefficient of the squared term, is designed to capture non 
linearity. 
The effect of transparency on inflation persistence is given by:   
                                                          
2
4 3 T T B 
 
                                               (4) 
In order to allow the regression to have a U shape, the standard 
approach has been to include a quadratic term in a linear model. Given 
(4) and the assumption of one extreme point, the requirement for a U 
shape is that the slope of the curve is negative at the start and positive 
at the end of a reasonably chosen interval of [Tmin, Tmax]. To assure at 
most one extreme point on [Tmin, Tmax] as assumed before, we require 
the following conditions: 




      
If either of theses inequalities is violated, the curve is not U-shaped but 
inversely U shaped or monotone. Figure 2 illustrates the various 




Accordingly, there exists an optimal intermediate transparency degree 
if  0   and    0 4 3   
 

















Fig. 2. Various transparency regimes (van der Cruisjen et al., [35]) 
 
 
3.1.3. Estimation method 
We have estimated a fixed effect panel model. That estimation is more 
appropriate when focusing on a specific set of N individuals that are not 
randomly selected from some large population
9. Since the sample data 
come specifically from OECD countries in this paper, the fixed effects 
model is more suitable for the analysis. The inclusion of individual 
effects is also justified by the fact that our control variables are time-
variant, contrary to the set of controls used in van der Cruisjen et al. 
[35]. 
                                                 
9 The random effects model is applicable if the panel data comprise N individuals drawn 

























By looking to the dynamic panel in equation (2), two important 
econometric issues emerge in the empirical analysis, which need a 
solution: 
1- Our cross sectional dimension of our panel is small; so that N 
consistent GMM estimators may be affected by potentially 
severe sample bias.  
2- The unbalanced nature of our panel doesn’t permit to correct the 
within estimator by applying the bias approximation formulae 
derived in Kiviet [24], Bun and Carree [6] and Bun and Kiviet 
[7], which is only valid for balanced panels. Our estimation 
strategy will employ a bias corrected LSDV estimator using 
formulae derived in Bruno [5] that accommodates also 
unbalanced panels. It is implemented in Stata, using Bruno’s 
code XTLSDVC. We make our results comparable to the 
standard LSDV corrected for hetroscedasticity
10 and with 
Anderson-Hsiao consistent estimators. We think them as 
reasonable benchmarks as both time series and cross section 
dimensions are short. We got, indeed, slight differences in the 
estimated coefficients resulting from LSDV (White, Anderson-
Hsiao) and LSDVC. While the first ones are reported for 
completeness, the more reliable outcomes are those from 
LSDVC. 
 
3.2 Results and discussion 
Results derived from using Minegishi and Cournède transparency 
index 
 
This study uses annual
11 data for 11 OECD countries under the period 
1999-2009. The choice of the period and frequency is restricted by the 
availability of data. These latter were mostly extracted from IMF 
(International Monetary Fund), WDI (World Development Indicators) 
databases. Countries and variables are listed in Table A.1. The choice 
                                                 
10 That method was employed by Minegishi and Counrède [27] when studying the impact of 
their transparency index on inflation in a dynamic panel model of OECD countries for the 
same period. 
11 Although quarterly data provide more observations, they may be subject to large 




of central banks’ sample is also justified by the fact that their 
inhabitants are known for processing information. 
All estimations were conducted using Stata10MP. In this 
subsection, we discuss the estimation results of the panel model. 
From Table 1 and Table 1bis, we can draw the following 
observations: clearly the coefficients associated with the quadratic form 
are highly significant, particularly  0 3  
 and 0 4  
 . In fact, 
transparency, in level, enters with a negative and significant coefficient 
and transparency squared enters positively and significantly. A large 
number of articles tried to test non monotone relationship, but hardly 
any of theses used adequate formal procedures when they test for the 
presence of the U shape. This includes van der Cruisjen et al. [35] 
analysis. They find that both 4 3   and   
 
 have the right sign and are 
individually significant. Based on this, they conclude that there’s a U 
shape. Lind and Mehlum [25] developed a nice test to detect such a non 
monotone relationship. The results are given at the last lines of the 
Tables and show a significant intermediate degree of transparency in all 
specifications estimated. This strongly confirms a U-shaped 
relationship between transparency and the inflation persistence. LSDV 
estimates exhibit a satisfactory fit of our hypothesis, but an optimal 
intermediate transparency is more pronounced when we use LSDVC 
estimates. The result seems to be strong even when we consider lagged 
values of transparency (Table 2, Table 2bis), however, when the lag is 
equal or exceeds 3, the impact turns to be insignificant
12. The procedure 
consists, as we mentioned in the above section, of two steps: first, we 
test for the existence of an intermediate degree of transparency. Second, 
it is interesting to determine the value of this intermediate score. For 
each regression, we determined the threshold at which the effect on 
inflation persistence is minimized. The values range between 0.65 and 
0.68. The estimated thresholds (extreme points) generated by the test 
are very close to the optimum. To illustrate this, we take for example 
the regression (1) from Table 1bis, we see that the effect is powerful 
when opaque central banks begin to open up and diminishes once a 
bank reached the level of transparency equal to 0.68. This level will 
change when we introduce control variables. 
Besides our main variable (transparency), we used a set of 
variables to serve as control determinants in the panel regressions. We 
                                                 




consider economic and political factors among those likely to affect the 
level of inflation or its persistence. Inflation targeting as a dummy 
seems to affect the inflation level, but not its persistence. The output 
gap is highly significant in all specifications and determines the level of 
inflation as well as its persistence. This is very logical because output 
gap is a key indicator of inflation; a positive output gap shows inflation 
pressures and a signal that policy may need to tighten. The exports ratio 
to GDP impacts on inflation level, which is an indicator of 
competition
13, but doesn’t affect the persistence of inflation. However, 
the rule of law has a significant and negative impact on the inflation 
persistence (See Table 2).
14 We find similar results by using LSDVC 
estimates. However, the significance of control variables is less 
pronounced by considering a bias correction à la Bruno (2005). The 
hypothesis of an intermediate transparency degree is confirmed by a 
graphical analysis. A visual inspection of the Figure 3 shows the form 
of parabola, each one corresponds to the regressions from (1) to (3) 




                                                 
13 Normally, we expect that more open economies have low inflation, but we found a positive 
impact. It is known in literature that the relationship openness-inflation has been considered 
as a puzzle. 
14 We also tried other political instruments such as political stability and regulatory quality but 
their respective coefficients were insignificant. We included them successively to avoid 































Fig. 3. Effect of Central Bank Transparency on inflation persistence:
2
4 3 T T B 
 
   based 
on regressions (1) to (3) from Table 2bis. We divided the transparency score by 100 to aid the 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table2. Alternative estimates by including other control variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. Sd. Coef. Sd. Coef. Sd. Coef. Sd. 





























      




      





















































































    
























Sample  1999-2009 1999-2009 1999-2009 1999-2009 
N°observations 80 80 79 90 
Optimum 0.64  0.64  0.61  0.60 
Interval Lower 
bound 
-0.541 -0.541 -0.541 -0.541
Upper 
bound 
3.523 3.523 3.523 3.523

























Extreme point  0.639  0.637  0.61  0.60 
Note: Results of the estimation of regression expressed in (2). T= Transparency index, IT= inflation targeting (set 1 at the 
date of adoption and 0 otherwise), *, **, *** imply statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. 
a Robust standard 
errors are between ( ). 






Table2bis. Alternative estimates by including other control variables_LSDVC 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
Coef. Sd. Coef. Sd. Coef.  Sd. 





it outgap   0.183
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Sample  1999-2009 1999-2009  1999-2009 
N°observations 80 80  99 
Optimum 0.65  0.65  0.67 
Interval Lower 
bound 
-0.541 -0.541  -0.541
Upper 
bound 




























Extreme point  0.646  0.650  0.671 
Note: Bias correction initialized by Anderson-Hsiao estimator. Bias approximation is carried out by the first 
leading term of the LSDV bias. Bootstrapped standard errors using 50 iterations are between () (cf. Bruno, 
2005). *, **, *** imply statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.
 
 Results by using Siklos (2011) data  
 
We replicated the same estimations by using the same sample of central 
banks over the same period, but we replaced the index of Minegishi and 
Cournède [27] by a measure that is updated by Siklos [31]. Data can be 
extracted from the website: http://www.central-bank-
communication.net/links/ 
The results are presented in Tables 3, Table 3bis and Table 4, Table 
4bis and suggest broadly favourable effects of transparency on the 
inflation persistence, particularly  0 3  
  and 0 4  
 . However, theses 
coefficients lose their significance when we consider lags of 2 and 3 in 
LSDV estimates, but when we consider LSDVC estimates, a lag of 3 of 
transparency turns to be significant. The U test confirms theses 
observations, as well as the graphical analysis which shows the U-
shaped curve (See Figure 4). Turning to the control variables, they are 
significant and most of them have the expected signs. Contrary to the 
results using the index of Minegishi and Cournède [27], the inflation 
targeting dummy doesn’t have a significant impact nor on inflation 
level, neither on its persistence
15. This is because transparency is 
picking up the effect of that variable. In fact, IT turns to be significant 
and has its expected sign when we drop transparency from the 
regression. Compared to the findings of Dincer and Eichengreen [12], 
the impact of transparency on inflation persistence has well improved, 
and we could detect the presence of an intermediate optimal 
transparency degree. The existence of an optimal intermediate 
transparency seems to be robust to various settings, but the exact value 
of the optimum is not. However, we could observe that it is high 
because OECD are better skilled to process information as we 
mentioned above, and theses skills are country-specific. Nevertheless, 
we should note that the value of this level is not the same for all central 
banks: it doesn’t only depend on the communication tactics perceived 
by the central bank (e.g. is the central bank inflation targeter? Does it 
use a simple rule of monetary policy?), but also, on the nature of the 
committee’s decision-making process (whether it is collegial or 
individualistic). There’s no unique approach for determining the 
                                                 





optimal degree of transparency, it differs through central banks’ 




















Fig. 4. Effect of Central Bank Transparency on inflation persistence:
2
4 3 T T B 
 
   based 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Results using constructive transparency index by PCA 
 
The index of transparency used by Siklos [31] is an updated version of 
the one constructed by Dincer and Eichengreen [12]. Theses authors 
have also updated the index of transparency based on the popular index 
of Eijffinger and Geraats [14]. The index of Eijffinger and Geraats has 
been criticized on a number of grounds. They remark themselves that it 
is obviously questionable to simply add the scores of the 15 
components in order to obtain a meaningful measure. In this section, 
we fill in this gap by constructing a weighted index of central bank 
transparency. Much of the past research has focused on constructing an 
index, but ignores the possible correlations between the variables 
forming the index and may carry redundant variables. The principal 
component analysis (PCA) is a feasible solution to these issues by 
distilling components from a Pearson correlation matrix. This applies to 
the transparency index of Siklos [31] which is based on the aggregation 
procedure followed by Eijffinger and Geraats [14]. Di Bartolomeo and 
Marchetti [11] remarked that even the partition elaborated by theses 
authors is comprehensive, the possibility of correlations between the 
sub-indexes and the strong multidimensionality of the concept require 
the use of the standard methods of multivariate eigen-analysis (the most 
classical of which is the PCA) appear particularly suited. 
Pearson correlation matrix of the set of initial sub-indexes of 
Siklos [31], given in Table C.1, shows a highly and significant pair 
wise correlations. Then, we proceeded to a PCA in order to extract a set 
of uncorrelated principal components, which are a weighted linear 
combination of the original data set: 
 





i i i t PC                                                   (5) 
Where ti is the sub-index of transparency score in Siklos [31]. Table 
C.3 displays the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy.  KMO takes values between 0 and 1, with high values 
(0.845) indicating that overall the variables have too much in common 
to warrant a PCA analysis. We used, then the first principal component 
as a proxy for the new transparency score. It explains 37.74% of the 
total variance (See Table C.2). Results of our estimations are given in 




largest influence on inflation persistence especially when we introduce 
output gap as % of GDP as control determinant of inflation and 
inflation persistence, respectively. Again, while the U shape test 
indicates a significant intermediate optimal level of transparency, the 
level itself is not the same in all specifications. The impact of 
transparency on inflation persistence, however, is weaker when 
introducing lagged values of transparency (lags 1 and 2) though 
4 3   and   
 






















Fig. 5. Effect of Central Bank Transparency on inflation persistence:
2
4 3 T T B 
 
   based 











Note that we didn’t consider endogenous aspects of transparency (in all 
of the three cases) as in Dincer and Eichengreen [12]
16. However, as 
noted by van der Cruisjen et al., “it is hard to find reliable instruments 
that strongly relate to central bank transparency”.  
 
 
                                                 
16 The fitted value of transparency was taken, based on a regression relating transparency to a 
constant and rule of law in their framework. Van der Cruisjen et al. [35] note that the quality 
of the model of Dincer and Eichengreen suffers from an omitted variable bias and it doesn’t 
perform well according to R




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 5bis. Central bank transparency and inflation persistence: PCA 
index_LSDVC estimates 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Coef. Sd. Coef. Sd. Coef. Sd.  Coef.  Sd. 









      
it exgdp     
 
 




















































































*  (0.0127)  0.0371
***  (0.0106
) 
1 1   it it xT    -0.183
*  (0.0789
) 
-0.175  (0.103)  -0.191








0.0221  (0.0120)  0.0228
*  (0.0102
) 












(0.0155)  0.0192  (0.0109
) 











-3.009 -3.009 -3.009 -3.009 
Upper 
bound 































































Note: Bias correction initialized by Anderson-Hsiao estimator. Bias approximation is carried 
out by the first leading term of the LSDV bias. Bootstrapped standard errors using 50 iterations 
are between () (cf. Bruno, 2005). 
 4 Conclusion and avenue for future research 
 
In this paper, we gave a further check of a recent result brought by van 
der Cruijsen et al. [35] who concluded the presence of an intermediate 
transparency at the optimum, based on the findings of a significantly 
negative coefficient on transparency term and a significantly positive 
estimate on the quadratic term and take them as evidence supporting 
the U shape curve. According to Lind and Mehlum [25], that 
conventional approach-although intuitive- is flawed. We revisit the 
hypothesis of an intermediate optimal central bank transparency by 
introducing both technical and economic differences in our 
specification. Particularly, we have used three other transparency 
indexes recently developed by Minegishi and Cournède [27], by Siklos 
[31] and an index constructed by PCA based on Siklos’s data. We 
found that the hypothesis of U-shaped relationship was strongly 
depicted in the case of central banks considered in our sample. The test 
results overwhelmingly reject the combined null hypothesis of an 
inverted-U or monotone relationship in favour of a U-shaped linkage 
between inflation persistence and central bank transparency by using an 
appropriate test developed by Lind and Mehlum [25]. The results are 
robust for controlling other determinants of inflation and inflation 
persistence, but a little bit weaker when we used lagged values of 
transparency. 
We acknowledge that results obtained here as well as in van der 
Cruijsen et al. [35] depend crucially on the transparency indexes used. 
Although they are complete in the sense that they cover all aspects and 
dimensions of transparency, they are based mainly on a quantitative 
side. However, it would be misleading to evaluate transparency only on 
the  basis of the amount of released information. The concept also 
encompasses features like accuracy, quality, truthfulness, and 
information relevance. These issues require further attention in 
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A. Data, sources and some preliminary statistics 
Table A.1. - Data and sample selected 
 





index (annual % 
increase) 





Output gap as % 
of GDP 
IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28 
Exports as 
a % of GDP 
(exgdp) 
Exports as a % of 
GDP 




set to be 1 at the 
time the country 
has adopted IT 
and 0 otherwise 
Pétursson (2004) 
Rule of 
Law (rl ) 






index of M&C 
Minegishi and Cournède (2009) 
T Transparency 
index of S 
 
http://www.central-bank-communication.net/links/ 
Countries considered in our sample 
Australia, Canada, Euro area, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 






Table A.2. Descriptive statistics 
 





Overall 0.670  0.15
9 
0.36 0.98  110 












Overall 10.481  2.22
9 
6 15 110 




Within   0.80
8 
6.3 11.8 
Note: M&C refers to Minegishi and Cournède and S refers to Siklos. 
Table A.3. Correlation matrix 
 
  Trans M&C  Trans S 
 
Trans M&C  1.00  
Trans S  0.73 1.00 






B. Methodology of calculating transparency indexes  






Political  Formal objectives Explicit communication and/or 
prioritization of final targets. 
1; 0,5; 0 
Quantitative 
targets 
Presence of targets quantification 1; 0 
Institutional 
arrangements 
Presence of explicit contracts 
between CB and government 
(e.g. instrument independence). 
1; 0,5; 0 
Economic Economic data Provision of data on GDP, money 
supply, inflation, unemployment 
and capacity utilization. 
1; 0,5; 0 
Policy models Disclosure of the CB’s formal 
macro-model(s) used for  policy 
analysis. 
1; 0 
Internal forecasts Regular communication or 
publication of CB’s forecasts.
1; 0,5; 0 
Procedural Explicit strategy Provision of a description of a 
CB’s policy rule (strategy). 
1; 0 
Minutes  Release of the decision boards 
minutes (in 8 weeks)
1; 0 





Decision on the main instruments 
or target announced at the latest 
day of implementation 
1; 0 
Policy explanation Provision of explanations of CB’s 
announced decisions  on 
targets/instruments. 
1; 0,5; 0 
Policy inclination Disclosure of CB’s likely future 
actions
1; 0 
Operational Control errors Provision of explanation for 
eventual deviation from the 
targets 
1; 0,5; 0 
Transmission 
disturbances 
Regular provision of information 
on disturbances  affecting the 
transmission process. 
1; 0,5; 0 
Evaluation of 
policy outcomes 
Regular provision of CB’s 
evaluation in light of its 
macroeconomic objectives. 
1; 0,5; 0 
Source: Di Bartolomeo and Marchetti (2004) according to Eijffinger and 










Policy objective Policy objective(s)  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Quantification  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Time horizon  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Policy decision  Policy changes  Announcement  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Explanation  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
No policy 
changes 
Announcement  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Explanation  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Future policy guidance  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Economic 
analysis
  Frequency of projection 
publication 
1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Endorsement of the decision-
making body 
1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Inflation 
projection 
Basic nature  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Projection time horizon  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Projection frequency  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Uncertainty  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Output projection  Basic nature  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Projection time horizon  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Projection frequency  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Uncertainty  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
  Underlying assumptions  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Decision-making process Minutes  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Voting records  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Public appearances  1; 0,75 ; 0,5; 0 
Source: Minegishi and Cournède (2009). The index takes the values between 















C. Principal Component Analysis results 
 
Table C.1. Pearson correlation matrix of sub-indexes: Data from Siklos (2011) 
 
 
Note: ti is the sub-index of Siklos overall transparency. P-values are given 
under each coefficient correlation. 
 
.
               
             
         t15      1.0000 
                     t15
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
         t15      0.3012   0.2855   0.4023   0.3393   0.1949   0.4190   0.5379 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
         t14      0.3521   0.3331   0.4906   0.4132   0.1579   0.3690   1.0000 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
         t13      0.4110   0.3965   0.3963   0.4896   0.3069   1.0000 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
         t12      0.3780   0.6311   0.2005   0.3842   1.0000 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
         t11      0.3760   0.4067   0.7646   1.0000 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000
         t10      0.4041   0.3142   1.0000 
             
                 0.0000
          t9      0.6850   1.0000 
               
             
          t8      1.0000 
                      t8       t9      t10      t11      t12      t13      t14
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
         t15      0.2342   0.2883   0.2954   0.3719   0.3206   0.5660   0.4220 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
         t14      0.2164   0.2646   0.2321   0.4231   0.3403   0.5200   0.2939 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
         t13      0.2049   0.2794   0.2557   0.4479   0.4017   0.4295   0.2747 
             
                 0.0991   0.3213   0.1417   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.5203
         t12      0.0474   0.0285   0.0422   0.2872   0.3390   0.2289   0.0185 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
         t11      0.2141   0.2217   0.2148   0.5275   0.5353   0.4494   0.2720 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
         t10      0.2782   0.1431   0.2299   0.4938   0.4122   0.5059   0.3138 
             
                 0.0234   0.1851   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.5210
          t9      0.0651   0.0381   0.1898   0.3979   0.4484   0.3768   0.0185 
             
                 0.0003   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
          t8      0.1049   0.1520   0.1346   0.3453   0.4307   0.3327   0.1252 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
          t7      0.2917   0.4574   0.3303   0.3197   0.2505   0.3763   1.0000 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
          t6      0.2012   0.2923   0.2983   0.4924   0.3871   1.0000 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
          t5      0.1426   0.2640   0.2068   0.4602   1.0000 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
          t4      0.1905   0.2505   0.3559   1.0000 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000
          t3      0.3863   0.3026   1.0000 
             
                 0.0003
          t2      0.1039   1.0000 
               
             
          t1      1.0000 




Table C.2. Principal Component Analysis 
 
Principal components/correlation             Number of obs    =      1209 
                                                                  Number of comp.  =        15 
                                                                  Trace            =        15 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)              Rho              =    1.0000 
     
          Comp15         .163915            .             0.0109       1.0000
          Comp14         .209853     .0459381             0.0140       0.9891
          Comp13          .36163      .151776             0.0241       0.9751
          Comp12         .429574     .0679442             0.0286       0.9510
          Comp11         .468595     .0390217             0.0312       0.9223
          Comp10         .517894     .0492991             0.0345       0.8911
           Comp9         .531651     .0137568             0.0354       0.8566
           Comp8         .598881     .0672295             0.0399       0.8211
           Comp7         .651177     .0522965             0.0434       0.7812
           Comp6         .675948     .0247708             0.0451       0.7378
           Comp5         .872376      .196428             0.0582       0.6927
           Comp4         .998497      .126121             0.0666       0.6346
           Comp3         1.00777     .0092738             0.0672       0.5680
           Comp2          1.8506      .842833             0.1234       0.5008
           Comp1         5.66163      3.81103             0.3774       0.3774
     
       Component      Eigenvalue   Difference         Proportion   Cumulative
     
 
 
Table C.3. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
 
     
         Overall     0.8455
     
             t15     0.8923
             t14     0.9170
             t13     0.9422
             t12     0.7617
             t11     0.8003
             t10     0.7837
              t9     0.7416
              t8     0.7934
              t7     0.8541
              t6     0.9223
              t5     0.9398
              t4     0.9443
              t3     0.7935
              t2     0.7552
              t1     0.7902
     
        Variable        kmo 
     
 
 
 
 
 